Chehab v Roitman, 2014 NY Slip Op 05939 (2d Dept. 2014)
I have to give credit to Alla Kleban for locating this case. Admittedly, I just scanned this one and did not pick up on any salient facts. But there are many.
“To effect a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510(1), a defendant must show that the plaintiff’s choice of venue is improper and that [his or her] choice of venue is proper” (Gonzalez v Sun Moon Enters. Corp., 53 AD3d 526, 526; see CPLR 511[b]; see also Lopez v K. Angle K Inc., 24 AD3d 422, 423). To succeed on his motion here, the defendant was obligated to demonstrate that, on the date that this action was commenced, neither of the parties resided in the county that was designated by the plaintiff (see Ramos v Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 62 AD3d 773; Baez v Marcus, 58 AD3d 585, 586; Corea v Browne, 45 AD3d 623, 624; see also Fiallos v New York Univ. Hosp., 85 AD3d 678, 678; Clarke v Ahern Prod. Servs., 181 AD2d 514, 515;Bradley v Plaisted, 277 App Div 620, 621). Only if the defendant made such a showing was the plaintiff required to establish, in opposition, via documentary evidence, that the venue he selected was proper (see Buziashvili v Ryan, 264 AD2d 797).
Here, the sole piece of evidence that the defendant submitted with respect to the issue of the plaintiff’s residence was the police accident report referable to the subject accident. This evidence merely showed that, at the time the accident occurred, the plaintiff had a residence in Texas. This evidence did not demonstrate that the plaintiff did not maintain a residence in Kings County at the time when the action was commenced, two months after the accident (see Ramos v Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 62 AD3d at 773; Baez v Marcus, 58 AD3d at 586; Corea v Browne, 45 AD3d at 624; see also Fiallos v New York Univ. Hosp., 85 AD3d at 678; Clarke v Ahern Prod. Servs., 181 AD2d at 515; Bradley v Plaisted, 277 App Div at 621). Consequently, the defendant failed to meet his initial burden.
Although a plaintiff may choose venue based solely on a defendant’s address, as set forth in a police accident report (see Gonzalez v Weiss, 38 AD3d 492, 493; Furth v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d at 510), a police accident report, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that, on the date that an action is commenced, a plaintiff does not reside in the county where he or she elects to place the venue of trial. To the extent that this Court’s decisions in Samuel v Green (276 AD2d 687) and Senzon v Uveges (265 AD2d 476) may be read to indicate to the contrary, they should not be followed.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion to change the venue “
Great Health Care Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 51324(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
This was proudly mine and another example of why it pays to put up a good fight as well as to be proceduraly savvy.
“Great Health Care Chiropractic, P.C. (Great Health) commenced this action on February 14, 2012 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services provided to its assignor as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident on December 10, 2010. After issue had been joined, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant opposed the motion on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish its prima facie case. While this no-fault action was pending, defendant, American Transit Insurance Company (American Transit), commenced a declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court, New York County, against Great Health and its assignor, among others, alleging that the assignor had breached the terms of the insurance policy by failing to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs) and that, as a result, American Transit is not obligated to pay any claims for first-party no-fault benefits submitted by Great Health as assignee of Kareem Lindsay arising out of the December 10, 2010 accident. Great Health asserted in its answer in Supreme Court that American Transit did not demonstrate good cause for requesting an EUO. The Supreme Court initially denied a motion by American Transit for, among other things, summary judgment but, upon reargument, granted the motion, finding that American Transit had demonstrated that it had timely mailed EUO scheduling letters to Great Health’s assignor; that the assignor had failed to appear for scheduled EUOs; and that Great Health had failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion. The Supreme Court awarded American Transit a declaratory judgment, dated January 25, 2013.
After being awarded the declaratory judgment, American Transit submitted, in this action, a supplemental affirmation by its counsel, in opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, in which he argued that plaintiff’s action is barred by res judicata. By order entered February 28, 2013, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and, upon a search of the record, granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice. This appeal by plaintiff ensued.
”(1) Plaintiff’s moving papers failed to establish either that defendant had failed to pay or deny the claims within the requisite 30-day period (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 ), or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 ). Consequently, plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment.”
(2) “Moreover, the Civil Court properly determined that the action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata (see EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Ava Acupuncture, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 149[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50233[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), as any judgment in favor of plaintiff in this action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the Supreme Court declaratory judgment (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 ; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U]).”
(3) Defendant’s failure to serve the Supreme Court’s order upon plaintiff with notice of entry is not fatal, in view of the binding and conclusive effect of the order (see All Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., ___ Misc 3d ___, 2014 NY Slip Op 24161 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]).
(4) While plaintiff argues that the Civil Court improvidently exercised its discretion in considering defendant’s untimely supplemental affirmation in opposition to plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, we reject this contention in view of the justification shown for the delay and plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate any prejudice arising therefrom (see Lawrence v Celtic Holdings, LLC, 85 AD3d 874 ; cf. Mosheyeva v Distefano, 288 AD2d 448 ; Risucci v Zeal Mgt. Corp., 258 AD2d 512 ). In view of the foregoing, we decline to disturb so much of the order as, upon a search of the record, granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.”
Every time Rybak appeals, he just digs that hole a little deeper and a little wider.
Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 51321(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
Good job to my colleague and friend James Sullivan on this one.
“Ultimate Health Products, Inc. (Ultimate Health) commenced this action in the Civil Court, Queens County, to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for supplies provided to its assignor as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. While this no-fault action was pending, defendant, American Transit Insurance Company (American Transit), commenced a declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court, New York County, against Ultimate Health and its assignor, among others, alleging that the assignor had breached the terms of the insurance policy by failing to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath and that, as a result, American Transit is not obligated to pay any claims for first-party no-fault benefits submitted by Ultimate Health as assignee of Carlos Martinez arising from the car accident in question. In December of 2011, plaintiff moved in the Civil Court for summary judgment. On May 15, 2012, the Supreme Court awarded American Transit a declaratory judgment on default. American Transit subsequently cross-moved in the Civil Court, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), to dismiss plaintiff’s action, contending that this action is barred by virtue of the declaratory judgment. Plaintiff opposed defendant’s cross motion and now appeals from an order of the Civil Court, entered January 18, 2013, which implicitly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion dismissing the complaint.
The Supreme Court determined that Ultimate Health’s assignor was not an eligible injured person entitled to no-fault benefits under the applicable policy, and that American Transit was not obligated to pay claims submitted by Ultimate Health as assignee of Carlos Martinez in any current or future proceedings arising under that policy from the car accident in question. In light of the declaratory judgment, the present action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata (see EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Ava Acupuncture, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 149[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50233[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. [*2]Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), as any judgment in favor of plaintiff in this action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the Supreme Court declaratory judgment (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 ; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U]). Plaintiff’s remaining arguments lack merit or were not preserved for appeal.”
This is from back when the good guys had the stage and providers had to earn their money.
Optimal Well-Being Chiropractic, P.C. v General Motors Assur. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 51323(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
“In support of its motion, defendant’s investigator stated that, based on the vehicle identification number set forth in the police report of the accident in question, the vehicle at issue was not a covered vehicle under the applicable policy. However, the recitation of the vehicle identification number was inconsistent throughout the papers submitted in support of defendant’s motion, thus raising a question of fact as to whether the vehicle was not covered under the applicable insurance policy. In view of defendant’s conflicting evidentiary submissions, defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact ”
Typos happen and sometimes you have to deal with it and move on. It just is not good when the typos form the basis of a non-coverage defense where there are probably no reserves set.
Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 51310(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
I often feel like this Plaintiff attorney is seeking to reinvent the wheel. It is just amazing how many times he appeals the SAME issues and (surprisingly) receives the SAME results. And each decision comments on one more subtle defect in this particular attorneys arguments. This is how bad law is made.
“In appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to prove that it had mailed its EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms or that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs; that defendant lacked justification for its EUO requests; and that defendant’s motion should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), as plaintiff had not received discovery regarding the reasonableness of defendant’s EUO requests.”
(1) “EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures”
(2) “the affirmation submitted by defendant’s attorney, who was present in his office to conduct plaintiff’s EUO on the scheduled dates, was sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to appear.”
(3) “Furthermore, since plaintiff does not claim to have responded in any way to the EUO requests, its objections regarding the EUO requests will not now be heard ”
(4) “Consequently, discovery relevant to the reasonableness of the EUO requests was not necessary for plaintiff to oppose defendant’s motion”
Glenn Segal PT, P.C. v GEICO, 2014 NY Slip Op 51301(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
“In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted a sworn statement by the chiropractor who had performed an independent medical examination (IME) of plaintiff’s assignor, as well as an affirmed report by the doctor who had performed a second IME. Both of the IMEs were performed before the services at issue were rendered. Each IME report set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the examiner’s conclusion that there was a lack of medical necessity for further treatment. In opposition to the cross motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from a doctor which failed to meaningfully refer to, let alone sufficiently rebut, the conclusions set forth in the chiropractor’s report, and further failed to sufficiently rebut the conclusions set forth in the doctor’s report (see Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009])”
Was the cut-off based upon the chiro or the physician? Has to be the latter you would think since it is PT services? Yet, the court commented on the chiro IME. Interesting.
Schutzstaffel Med. Care, P.C. v Eveready Ins. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 51305(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
“Defendant demonstrated that it had not received the requested verification. Plaintiff did not oppose defendant’s cross motion. Contrary to the Civil Court’s statement, there is nothing in the record which would require defendant to prove that the copies of the verification letters annexed to defendant’s cross motion had not been tampered with or altered (see Schozer v William Penn Life Ins. Co. of NY, 84 NY2d 639, 643 ; People v Dicks, 100 AD3d 528 ; Rotanelli v Longo, 210 AD2d 392 ). As the 30-day period within which defendant was required to pay or deny the claims did not begin to run (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.8 [a]”
Schozer is a case that this particular Plaintiff loves to harp upon; yet, always gets it wrong. I never knew certain Civil Court Kings County judges required an affirmative showing of lack of tampering in order to preserve particular defenses.
Sky Med. Supply Inc. v Elrac Inc., 2014 NY Slip Op 24232 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co. 2014)
Court held that oral notification of claim was sufficient and seems to obviate the need the need to provide written notice of claim. Therefore, the carrier loses. I am not going to parse the decision because it is convoluted how it is written.
My first thought is why is a case like this going to “trial”? My second thought is wouldn’t the better line of reasoning be that the denial was valid since there was not timely written notice of claim; however, the plaintiff can still prevail if they can satisfy as Judge Ciaffa called it in Medical Select v. Allstate (another case that should never have went to trial) the safety valve provision of the regulations regarding late notice?
Now, since you are at trial, wouldn’t the provider have to prove the applicability and reasonableness of the so-called safety valve through producing the assignor at “trial” to testify as to why he/she did not file a timely notice of claim?
The decision seems backwards to me.
People v Laracuente, 21 AD3d 1389 (4th Dept. 2005)
“We reject the further contention of defendant that the court abused its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of the Deputy Medical Examiner (see People v Perez, 299 AD2d 427 , lv denied 99 NY2d 618 ; People v Rodriguez, 184 AD2d 599 , lv denied 80 NY2d 933 ). Indeed, the court properly limited the cross-examination in order to prevent questioning with respect to a text that was not established to be authoritative (see People v Feldman, 299 NY 153, [*2]168 ; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 7-313 [Farrell 11th ed]), and to prevent questioning concerning hearsay information in a report that was not admitted in evidence (see generally People v Jones, 73 NY2d 427, 430 ; People v Kaplan, 167 AD2d 273 , lv denied 77 NY2d 879 ). Furthermore, the court properly limited defendant’s recross-examination of the Deputy Medical Examiner to the scope of the People’s questioning on redirect examination (see e.g. People v Hemphill, 247 AD2d 339 , appeals dismissed 92 NY2d 846 , lv denied 92 NY2d 898 ).”
Use this when the plaintiff attempts to have your expert agree with certain non authorative texts or statements from reports that are not in evidence.
Parsons Med. Supply, Inc. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 2013 NY Slip Op 52328(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
“Based upon an assessment of damages submitted by plaintiff, a judgment was entered on March 12, 2011 awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $2,680 plus interest in the sum of $1,393.60, the interest being awarded from October 27, 2008, the date of the filing of the summons and complaint. Defendant thereafter moved to modify the judgment, arguing that, pursuant to CCA 412, the interest should have been awarded from January 26, 2009, the date of the service of the summons and complaint. The Civil Court denied defendant’s motion. We reverse.”
“In this case, defendant timely denied the claims at issue and plaintiff did not commence the action within 30 days the of receipt of those denials. Thus, the interest did not begin to accrue until plaintiff commenced this action. New York City Civil Court Act 400 (1) provides that a Civil Court action is commenced by the filing of a summons and complaint. ”
“Because the no-fault regulations provide that, in situations such as the one here, interest on a no-fault claim does not accrue until the date of the inception of the action, CCA 412 applies (see 65 Siegel’s Practice Review, The New § 412, on the Accrual of Interest, at 1 [Sept. 2005]; All Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 38 Misc 3d 268 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2012]). Therefore, the interest in this case should have been awarded from the date of the service of the summons and complaint, rather than from the date of the filing thereof.”
Because the no-fault regulations provide that, in situations such as the one here, interest on a no-fault claim does not accrue until the date of the inception of the action, CCA 412 applies (see 65 Siegel’s Practice Review, The New § 412, on the Accrual of Interest, at 1 [Sept. 2005]; All Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 38 Misc 3d 268 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2012]). Therefore, the interest in this case should have been awarded from the date of the service of the summons and complaint, rather than from the date of the filing thereof.
Judge Levine’s theory on this has been affirmed. It makes sense when you think about it.