47 Thames Realty, LLC v Robinson, 2014 NY Slip Op 06051 (2d Dept. 2014)
“22 NYCRR 202.48, entitled “[s]ubmission of orders, judgments and decrees for signature,” states in pertinent part:
“(a) Proposed orders or judgments, with proof of service on all parties where the order is directed to be settled or submitted on notice, must be submitted for signature, unless otherwise directed by the court, within 60 days after the signing and filing of the decision directing that the order be settled or submitted.
“(b) Failure to submit the order or judgment timely shall be deemed an abandonment of the motion or action, unless for good cause shown.”
Here, the so-called 60-day rule set forth in 22 NYCRR 202.48 is not applicable because the Supreme Court’s direction that the defendants submit a proposed order with respect to an award of an attorney’s fee did not specify that the proposed order be settled or submitted on notice (see Farkas v Farkas, 11 NY3d 300, 309; Shamshovich v Shvartsman, 110 AD3d 975, 976-977; Matter of Village of Dobbs Ferry v Stanley Ave. Props., Inc., 95 AD3d 1027, 1029). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s contention that the defendants abandoned their claim for an award of an attorney’s fee by failing to comply with the 60-day rule is without merit.”
Just note the difference between the three directives that do not arise from a “decision/order”: (a) Submit order [not within gambit of 60-day rule]; (b) Settle order [within gambit of 60-day rule]; (c) submit order on notice [within gambit of 60-day rule].
Epic Pain Mgt. & Anesthesia Consultants, LLC v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 51391(U)(App. Term 1st Dept. 2014)
“Defendant’s moving submission below relied exclusively on a worker’s compensation fee schedule defense, and failed to address, much less refute the applicability of Insurance Department regulation (11 NYCRR) § 68.6, which provides that where, as here, a reimbursable health service “is performed outside New York State, the permissible charge for such service shall be the prevailing fee in the geographic location of the provider.” Notably absent from defendant’s moving papers was any discussion of the proper “geographic location” of the plaintiff provider — which apparently maintains offices in both New York and New Jersey — or of the “prevailing fee” were such location determined to be in New Jersey”
What is the “prevailing fee”? Is it the New Jersey fee schedule or something else? Unsure. I think Nassau Anesthesia Assoc. P.C. v Chin, 32 Misc.3d 282 (Dis. Ct. Nassau Co. 2011) is relevant on this point: “To the contrary, as recognized in Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v Healthcare Mgt. Alternatives, Inc. (832 A2d 501 [Pa Super Ct 2003]), the amounts “actually received” by medical providers from insurers are a far better indicator of the reasonable value of a provider’s services than the “full published charged” unilaterally set by the provider. (832 A2d at 508-510.)”
Donoso v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 118 AD3d 461 (1st Dept. 2014)
This came out a few months ago and I meant to post it. There was a case in 2014 where Judge Ciaffa (District, Nassau County) held that stipulated post-IME treatment notes were sufficient to rebut the testimony of an IME physician and to prove that the services were medically necessary. Literally, one month after All in One was published, the First Department published Donoso which says otherwise.
Here are the facts and the law:
“Plaintiff claims that she suffered permanent consequential and significant limitations of use of her lumbar spine as a result of an accident involving a motor vehicle (see Insurance Law § 5102 [d]). At trial, she testified that she was knocked over by a car and thereafter suffered back pain and injuries for which she received physical therapy and epidural injections, and that she underwent surgery four years later. Ambulance and emergency room records admitted into evidence show that the then 65-year-old plaintiff complained of back pain following the accident, and medical records of the treatment about which plaintiff testified show, inter alia, that the surgical procedure was a laminectomy to address spinal stenosis. Plaintiff did not call any treating physician or medical expert to testify.
Defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, arguing that plaintiff could not prove causation without a doctor’s testimony (see CPLR 4401). Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, since defendant’s argument constituted a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and indeed plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion on the ground that her medical records were sufficient, the issue whether plaintiff established prima facie that she suffered a serious injury causally related to the motor vehicle accident is preserved for review (see Geraci v Probst, 15 NY3d 336, 342 ).
Plaintiff presented no evidence of a causal connection between the motor vehicle accident and her lumbar condition. The medical records do not contain an opinion given by a physician that there was a causal connection between the accident and plaintiff’s disc herniation or the spinal stenosis for which she underwent surgery four years later. Indeed, the impression of one of plaintiff’s treating physicians, according to his medical records, was “[d]egenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine.” However, if the records had contained an opinion, the trial court could not have considered them, because the opining physician was not available for cross-examination (see Rickert v Diaz, 112 AD3d 451 [1st Dept 2013]; **2 Daniels v Simon, 99 AD3d 658, 660 [2d Dept 2012]). Thus, defendant was correct that plaintiff could not prove causation without a doctor’s testimony, and its motion should have been granted because “there [was] no rational process by which the fact trier could base a finding in favor of [plaintiff]” (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556 ; see e.g. Ciocca v Park, 21 AD3d 671 [3d Dept 2005], affd 5 NY3d 835 ).”
What’s the lesson of the story? You must have an expert opine that the service was medically necessary. I hope GEICO appealed All in one, but I am not holding my breath.
Lotus Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 51315(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
“In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs). The motion was supported by, among other things, an affirmation from a partner in the law firm representing defendant, attesting to plaintiff’s failure to appear. Plaintiff cross-moved to, among other things, disqualify the law firm representing defendant, pursuant to rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0), on the ground that a member of the firm was a necessary witness in this case. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court entered August 3, 2012 granting defendant’s motion and denying plaintiff’s cross motion. A judgment was subsequently entered dismissing the complaint, from which the appeal is deemed to have been taken (see CPLR 5501 [c]).
“In light of the foregoing, plaintiff’s request that defendant’s law firm be disqualified based [*2]on the attorney/witness rule is “moot since, summary judgment having been granted, there will be no trial of this matter” (Quiros v Mount St. Michael Academy, 303 AD2d 185, 186 ; see also Lombino v Town Bd. of Town of Rye, 206 AD2d 462 ). In any event, plaintiff failed to establish that disqualification of defendant’s law firm was warranted (see S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp., 69 NY2d 437 ; see also e.g. Magnus v Sklover, 95 AD3d 837 ; Matter of Advent Assoc., LLC v Vogt Family Inv. Partners, L.P., 56 AD3d 1023 ; Hudson Val. Mar., Inc. v Town of Cortlandt, 54 AD3d 999 ; Daniel Gale Assoc., Inc. v George, 8 AD3d 608 ;Broadwhite Assoc. v Truong, 237 AD2d 162 ; Matter of Cowen & Co. v Tecnoconsult Holdings, 234 AD2d 86 ; Talvy v American Red Cross in Greater NY, 205 AD2d 143 , affd 87 NY2d 826 ; Kaplan v Maytex Mills, 187 AD2d 565 ).”
Chehab v Roitman, 2014 NY Slip Op 05939 (2d Dept. 2014)
I have to give credit to Alla Kleban for locating this case. Admittedly, I just scanned this one and did not pick up on any salient facts. But there are many.
“To effect a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510(1), a defendant must show that the plaintiff’s choice of venue is improper and that [his or her] choice of venue is proper” (Gonzalez v Sun Moon Enters. Corp., 53 AD3d 526, 526; see CPLR 511[b]; see also Lopez v K. Angle K Inc., 24 AD3d 422, 423). To succeed on his motion here, the defendant was obligated to demonstrate that, on the date that this action was commenced, neither of the parties resided in the county that was designated by the plaintiff (see Ramos v Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 62 AD3d 773; Baez v Marcus, 58 AD3d 585, 586; Corea v Browne, 45 AD3d 623, 624; see also Fiallos v New York Univ. Hosp., 85 AD3d 678, 678; Clarke v Ahern Prod. Servs., 181 AD2d 514, 515;Bradley v Plaisted, 277 App Div 620, 621). Only if the defendant made such a showing was the plaintiff required to establish, in opposition, via documentary evidence, that the venue he selected was proper (see Buziashvili v Ryan, 264 AD2d 797).
Here, the sole piece of evidence that the defendant submitted with respect to the issue of the plaintiff’s residence was the police accident report referable to the subject accident. This evidence merely showed that, at the time the accident occurred, the plaintiff had a residence in Texas. This evidence did not demonstrate that the plaintiff did not maintain a residence in Kings County at the time when the action was commenced, two months after the accident (see Ramos v Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 62 AD3d at 773; Baez v Marcus, 58 AD3d at 586; Corea v Browne, 45 AD3d at 624; see also Fiallos v New York Univ. Hosp., 85 AD3d at 678; Clarke v Ahern Prod. Servs., 181 AD2d at 515; Bradley v Plaisted, 277 App Div at 621). Consequently, the defendant failed to meet his initial burden.
Although a plaintiff may choose venue based solely on a defendant’s address, as set forth in a police accident report (see Gonzalez v Weiss, 38 AD3d 492, 493; Furth v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d at 510), a police accident report, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that, on the date that an action is commenced, a plaintiff does not reside in the county where he or she elects to place the venue of trial. To the extent that this Court’s decisions in Samuel v Green (276 AD2d 687) and Senzon v Uveges (265 AD2d 476) may be read to indicate to the contrary, they should not be followed.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion to change the venue “
Great Health Care Chiropractic, P.C. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 51324(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
This was proudly mine and another example of why it pays to put up a good fight as well as to be proceduraly savvy.
“Great Health Care Chiropractic, P.C. (Great Health) commenced this action on February 14, 2012 to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for services provided to its assignor as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident on December 10, 2010. After issue had been joined, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant opposed the motion on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish its prima facie case. While this no-fault action was pending, defendant, American Transit Insurance Company (American Transit), commenced a declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court, New York County, against Great Health and its assignor, among others, alleging that the assignor had breached the terms of the insurance policy by failing to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath (EUOs) and that, as a result, American Transit is not obligated to pay any claims for first-party no-fault benefits submitted by Great Health as assignee of Kareem Lindsay arising out of the December 10, 2010 accident. Great Health asserted in its answer in Supreme Court that American Transit did not demonstrate good cause for requesting an EUO. The Supreme Court initially denied a motion by American Transit for, among other things, summary judgment but, upon reargument, granted the motion, finding that American Transit had demonstrated that it had timely mailed EUO scheduling letters to Great Health’s assignor; that the assignor had failed to appear for scheduled EUOs; and that Great Health had failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion. The Supreme Court awarded American Transit a declaratory judgment, dated January 25, 2013.
After being awarded the declaratory judgment, American Transit submitted, in this action, a supplemental affirmation by its counsel, in opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, in which he argued that plaintiff’s action is barred by res judicata. By order entered February 28, 2013, the Civil Court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and, upon a search of the record, granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice. This appeal by plaintiff ensued.
“(1) Plaintiff’s moving papers failed to establish either that defendant had failed to pay or deny the claims within the requisite 30-day period (see Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 33 ), or that defendant had issued a timely denial of claim that was conclusory, vague or without merit as a matter of law (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Westchester Med. Ctr. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 78 AD3d 1168 ). Consequently, plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment.”
(2) “Moreover, the Civil Court properly determined that the action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata (see EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Ava Acupuncture, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 149[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50233[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), as any judgment in favor of plaintiff in this action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the Supreme Court declaratory judgment (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 ; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U]).”
(3) Defendant’s failure to serve the Supreme Court’s order upon plaintiff with notice of entry is not fatal, in view of the binding and conclusive effect of the order (see All Boro Psychological Servs., P.C. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., ___ Misc 3d ___, 2014 NY Slip Op 24161 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]).
(4) While plaintiff argues that the Civil Court improvidently exercised its discretion in considering defendant’s untimely supplemental affirmation in opposition to plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, we reject this contention in view of the justification shown for the delay and plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate any prejudice arising therefrom (see Lawrence v Celtic Holdings, LLC, 85 AD3d 874 ; cf. Mosheyeva v Distefano, 288 AD2d 448 ; Risucci v Zeal Mgt. Corp., 258 AD2d 512 ). In view of the foregoing, we decline to disturb so much of the order as, upon a search of the record, granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.”
Every time Rybak appeals, he just digs that hole a little deeper and a little wider.
Ultimate Health Prods., Inc. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 51321(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
Good job to my colleague and friend James Sullivan on this one.
“Ultimate Health Products, Inc. (Ultimate Health) commenced this action in the Civil Court, Queens County, to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for supplies provided to its assignor as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. While this no-fault action was pending, defendant, American Transit Insurance Company (American Transit), commenced a declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court, New York County, against Ultimate Health and its assignor, among others, alleging that the assignor had breached the terms of the insurance policy by failing to appear for duly scheduled examinations under oath and that, as a result, American Transit is not obligated to pay any claims for first-party no-fault benefits submitted by Ultimate Health as assignee of Carlos Martinez arising from the car accident in question. In December of 2011, plaintiff moved in the Civil Court for summary judgment. On May 15, 2012, the Supreme Court awarded American Transit a declaratory judgment on default. American Transit subsequently cross-moved in the Civil Court, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), to dismiss plaintiff’s action, contending that this action is barred by virtue of the declaratory judgment. Plaintiff opposed defendant’s cross motion and now appeals from an order of the Civil Court, entered January 18, 2013, which implicitly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendant’s cross motion dismissing the complaint.
The Supreme Court determined that Ultimate Health’s assignor was not an eligible injured person entitled to no-fault benefits under the applicable policy, and that American Transit was not obligated to pay claims submitted by Ultimate Health as assignee of Carlos Martinez in any current or future proceedings arising under that policy from the car accident in question. In light of the declaratory judgment, the present action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata (see EBM Med. Health Care, P.C. v Republic W. Ins., 38 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; Ava Acupuncture, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 149[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50233[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. [*2]Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]), as any judgment in favor of plaintiff in this action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the Supreme Court declaratory judgment (see Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 NY 304, 306-307 ; SZ Med., P.C. v Erie Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51221[U]). Plaintiff’s remaining arguments lack merit or were not preserved for appeal.”
This is from back when the good guys had the stage and providers had to earn their money.
Optimal Well-Being Chiropractic, P.C. v General Motors Assur. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 51323(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
“In support of its motion, defendant’s investigator stated that, based on the vehicle identification number set forth in the police report of the accident in question, the vehicle at issue was not a covered vehicle under the applicable policy. However, the recitation of the vehicle identification number was inconsistent throughout the papers submitted in support of defendant’s motion, thus raising a question of fact as to whether the vehicle was not covered under the applicable insurance policy. In view of defendant’s conflicting evidentiary submissions, defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact ”
Typos happen and sometimes you have to deal with it and move on. It just is not good when the typos form the basis of a non-coverage defense where there are probably no reserves set.
Natural Therapy Acupuncture, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 51310(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
I often feel like this Plaintiff attorney is seeking to reinvent the wheel. It is just amazing how many times he appeals the SAME issues and (surprisingly) receives the SAME results. And each decision comments on one more subtle defect in this particular attorneys arguments. This is how bad law is made.
“In appeal, plaintiff argues that defendant failed to prove that it had mailed its EUO scheduling letters and denial of claim forms or that plaintiff had failed to appear for the EUOs; that defendant lacked justification for its EUO requests; and that defendant’s motion should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), as plaintiff had not received discovery regarding the reasonableness of defendant’s EUO requests.”
(1) “EUO scheduling letters and the denial of claim forms had been timely mailed in accordance with defendant’s standard office practices and procedures”
(2) “the affirmation submitted by defendant’s attorney, who was present in his office to conduct plaintiff’s EUO on the scheduled dates, was sufficient to establish that plaintiff had failed to appear.”
(3) “Furthermore, since plaintiff does not claim to have responded in any way to the EUO requests, its objections regarding the EUO requests will not now be heard ”
(4) “Consequently, discovery relevant to the reasonableness of the EUO requests was not necessary for plaintiff to oppose defendant’s motion”
Glenn Segal PT, P.C. v GEICO, 2014 NY Slip Op 51301(U)(App. Term 2d Dept. 2014)
“In support of its cross motion, defendant submitted a sworn statement by the chiropractor who had performed an independent medical examination (IME) of plaintiff’s assignor, as well as an affirmed report by the doctor who had performed a second IME. Both of the IMEs were performed before the services at issue were rendered. Each IME report set forth a factual basis and medical rationale for the examiner’s conclusion that there was a lack of medical necessity for further treatment. In opposition to the cross motion, plaintiff submitted an affidavit from a doctor which failed to meaningfully refer to, let alone sufficiently rebut, the conclusions set forth in the chiropractor’s report, and further failed to sufficiently rebut the conclusions set forth in the doctor’s report (see Pan Chiropractic, P.C. v Mercury Ins. Co., 24 Misc 3d 136[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51495[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009])”
Was the cut-off based upon the chiro or the physician? Has to be the latter you would think since it is PT services? Yet, the court commented on the chiro IME. Interesting.